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Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP82R00025R000400220004-4

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5 February 1965

DCI BRIEFING
FOR THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

CUBA
(Military)

- I. There are now only about 2,000 Soviet military technicians and advisors still in Cuba.
 - A. Soviet advisors, instructors, and technicians are present in virtually all elements of the Cuban armed forces.
 - B. Most of the Soviets are probably associated with the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system and the ground forces, although a few are training Cuban naval and air force personnel.

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SAM readiness and radar tracking deteriorated sharply after the Cuban takeover of the air defense system.

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- II. The Cubans appear to be in full control of all the weapons in Cuba, including the SAMs, although they are almost wholly dependent on the Soviets for instruction, maintenance, and spare parts.
- III. The issue of control is important, because we continue to fly U-2 photo-reconnaissance missions over Cuba despite both Cuban and Soviet protests.

A.

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forecast that the Cubans were going to make a big issue of overflights after the US elections.

- B. They were going to use the UN General Assembly as a forum to press for an end to overflights.
- C. So far, the anticipated propaganda campaign hasn't materialized. The Cubans may have decided to go slow in their anti-U-2 campaign after the change of command in the Kremlin or as the result of our own reaction to Cuban and Soviet threats. In this connection, the Cubans may have been impressed by the US actions following a North

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Vietnamese attack on one of our destroyers
in the Tonkin Gulf.

IV. Soviet military shipments to Cuba have been declining lately and appear to be consistent with routine maintenance support.

A. There were five full shiploads in the first half of 1964, and only two full shiploads in the second half. In contrast, there were 10 full shiploads in 1963.

B. The major items delivered this past year--in addition to spare parts, ammunition, and supplies--were about 20 MIG-17s, a few small subchasers, and six torpedo boats.

V. The Cuban Army is increasing its combat proficiency and training, and has largely assimilated the relatively modern Soviet equipment transferred to it in late 1963.

A. Cuban units are conducting more maneuvers, but still are not capable of large coordinated operations.

B. They still have serious deficiencies in logistics and quality of personnel, and much of their time is taken up with counter-insurgent activity, harvesting, and other such duties.

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C. As more draftees are trained under the compulsory military service law which started last March, however, the quality of the Cuban Army should rise.

IV. The Cuban Air Force has been conducting more advanced training, but is still short of pilots. More pilots may be training in the USSR.

A. The Cuban Air Force now has 138 MIGs, including 86 MIG-15s and -17s (Fagots and Frescos), 12 supersonic MIG-19s (Farmers), and 40 Mach-2 MIG-21s (Fishbeds). Ten of the MIG-19s have an all-weather capability, but the rest of the fighters are limited to daylight and clear weather for effective air defense intercepts.

B. The Cubans are making increasing use of their IL-14 transports in coastal patrols and flare dropping. These planes have a much greater range and longer endurance than the Cuban fighters.

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CUBA (Non-Military)

- I. The Cubans are optimistic that the 1965 sugar harvest will be significantly above last year's total of about 4 million tons. Better organization this year, the use of more experienced cane cutters, good rainfall, technological and some manpower assistance from the USSR, and more extensive use of mechanization will probably put this year's harvest over 4.5 million tons.
- II. The Cuban political situation has been clouded the last couple of months by persistent rumors,
[redacted] that tensions have increased among elements of the Cuban leadership.
 - A. There is no indication whatever that the regime's military or security forces--whose key leaders are loyal to Castro--have split away, or that Castro's personal position is in any way threatened.

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- B. The trouble seems to have stemmed from the continuing differences between the regime's "old" and "new" Communists, probably aggravated by efforts on the part of Cuba's leaders to cope with their pressing economic problems.
- C. An abortive plot by "old-line" Communists to overthrow the Castro government is rumored to have come to a head in mid-November. Some Cuban Army and government officials are said to have been arrested and recent reports state several prominent old-line Communists are slated for removal.

D.

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[redacted]
old-Communist Joaquin Ordoqui--who was "suspended" from his high party and government posts in mid-November--will be publicly tried for treason soon. Should this occur, the old-new Communist problem will be fanned anew, and another irritant in Havana's relations with Moscow could develop.

III. Cuban leaders are

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[redacted]
upset by Khrushchev's removal, and uncertain about their future relationship with Moscow.

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- A. In his 2 January speech, Castro was more emphatic than in any previous public appearance in asserting his refusal to accept dictation from abroad and affirming Cuba's autonomy within the "socialist camp."
- B. The Soviets are known to be urging Havana to get its financial house in order and make greater efforts to become less of an economic burden on the USSR.

IV.

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- V. Castro is said to be intrigued with the idea of participating in the "liberation struggles" in Africa and is said to be awaiting the return of Che Guevara in order to have a first-hand report on the revolutionary potential there.
- A. Guevara's trip took him to Algeria, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Ghana, and Dahomey.

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B. He offered Cuba's "moral support" to the Congo rebels, as well as scholarships and training to some African nationalist groups, notably a leftist-oriented Angolan faction.

C. Guevara arrived in Peiping on 3 February via Paris from Algiers. [redacted]

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[redacted] reports Che will attempt to resolve Havana-Peiping "policy differences" on Latin America. The Chinese Communists are said to be disgusted that the Cubans did not support the extremist demands of some pro-Peiping Latin American Communists at a hemisphere meeting of Communists held in Havana last November.

VI. [redacted]

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statements of Cuban leaders strongly indicate that export of the revolution continues to be a key policy of the Castro regime.

A. On 13 December, while in New York to address the UN General Assembly session, Che Guevara said that "bullets not ballots" will bring revolution in Latin America. He candidly admitted that Cuba has given military training to Venezuelan "freedom fighters."

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- B. Cuban aid to Latin American revolutionaries is channeled through the General Directorate of Intelligence, a highly professional organization advised by Soviet experts.
- C. Nevertheless, Castro probably no longer expects "new Cubas" to spring up soon in Latin America. Havana seems to be focusing on those countries--Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia--where it believes prospects over the long run are brightest and where the insurgents have demonstrated a willingness to undertake anti-government terrorist activity.

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